Cite as: 516 U. S. 325 (1996)
Opinion of the Court
(f) The state courts should determine in the first instance the proper remedy and whether Fulton has complied with the procedural requirements of the State's tax refund statute. Pp. 346-347. 338 N. C. 472, 450 S. E. 2d 728, reversed and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 348.
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner.
Charles Rothfeld argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Marilyn R. Mudge, Assistant Attorney General, and Laurie R. Rubenstein.*
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case we decide whether North Carolina's "intangibles tax" on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by North Carolina residents inversely proportional to the corporation's exposure to the State's income tax violates the Commerce Clause. We hold that it does.
I
During the period in question here, North Carolina levied an "intangibles tax" on the fair market value of corporate stock owned by North Carolina residents or having a "business, commercial, or taxable situs" in the State. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 105-203 (1992).1 Although the tax was assessed at
*Jennifer Sartor Smart filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Revenue Cabinet, as amicus curiae urging affirmance.
1 The intangibles tax has subsequently been repealed. See 1995 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 41. Because the repeal has no retroactive effect, however, it does not affect the tax years at issue in this litigation. This case accordingly remains a justiciable controversy. See, e. g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 498-500 (1969) (holding that the obviation of the petitioner's claim for injunctive relief did not render the whole case moot, when a damages claim for backpay remained).
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