Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 2 (1996)

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350

PEACOCK v. THOMAS

Syllabus

a money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment. Although ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised (1) to permit disposition by a single court of factually interdependent claims, and (2) to enable a court to function successfully by effectuating its decrees, Thomas has not carried his burden of demonstrating that this suit falls within either category. First, because a federal court sitting in a subsequent lawsuit involving claims with no independent basis for jurisdiction lacks the threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted in the same proceeding as the claims conferring federal jurisdiction, claims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to claims brought in the earlier suit will not support federal jurisdiction over the subsequent suit. In any event, there is insufficient factual or logical interdependence between the claims raised in Thomas' first and second suits. Second, cases in which this Court has approved the exercise of ancillary enforcement jurisdiction over attachment, garnishment, and other supplementary proceedings involving third parties are inapposite. This case is governed by H. C. Cook Co. v. Beecher, 217 U. S. 497, in which the Court refused to authorize the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment. As long as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sufficiently protect a judgment creditor's ability to execute on a judgment, ancillary jurisdiction should not be exercised over proceedings, such as the present, that are new actions based on different theories of relief than the prior decree. Pp. 354-359.

39 F. 3d 493, reversed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 360.

David L. Freeman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were J. Theodore Gentry, Carter G. Phillips, and Richard D. Bernstein. J. Kendall Few argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were John C. Few, Margaret A. Chamberlain, and James R. Gilreath.

Richard P. Bress argued the cause for the United States as Amicus Curiae in support of respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Solicitor

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