Cite as: 517 U. S. 952 (1996)
Stevens, J., dissenting
gerrymandered on racial lines' "). Although a court may not like the State's explanation, that is no excuse for ignoring it.
If some independent bar prevented the use of that race-neutral criterion, then the District Court might be in a position to object to the State's use of it. We have, however, affirmed that a State has an interest in incumbency protection, see, e. g., ante, at 964-965 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); White v. Weiser, 412 U. S. 783, 791, 797 (1973), and also assured States that the Constitution does not require compactness, contiguity, or respect for political borders, see Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 647. While egregious political gerrymandering may not be particularly praiseworthy, see infra, at 1038- 1040, it may nonetheless provide the race-neutral explanation necessary for a State to avoid strict scrutiny of the district lines where gerrymandering is the "dominant and controlling" explanation for the odd district shapes.27
The District Court's error had an apparently dispositive effect on its assessment of whether strict scrutiny should apply at all. Although aspects of our dispute with the plurality are "largely factual," ante, at 971, n., they arise not out of our disagreement with the District Court's credibility assessments, but out of that court's erroneous conclusion that the State's overwhelming reliance on this race-neutral factor was illegitimate and irrelevant to its evaluation of the factors involved in the shifting of this district's lines. A fair evaluation of the record made in light of appropriate legal standards requires a conclusion very different from the District Court's. By following the District Court down its misdirected path, the plurality itself goes astray.
27 While it may be that the political gerrymandering in this case is "different in degree" from that previously recognized, 861 F. Supp., at 1334, I do not believe that the reference in Shaw I and Miller to "traditional" districting principles, see Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 642; Miller, 515 U. S., at 916, was intended to prohibit a State from changing the process or policies underlying the complex negotiating process that is modern redistricting.
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