Cite as: 517 U. S. 952 (1996)
Souter, J., dissenting
assumed Gingles district); ante, at 1035 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]t now seems clear that the only way that a State can both create a majority-minority district and avoid a racial gerrymander is by drawing . . . within the 'limited degree of leeway' granted by the Court . . . the precise compact district that a court would impose in a successful § 2 challenge"). If the Court were to say that a district drawn to avoid dilution must respond to the dilution threat in some geographically exact way, but see Shaw II, ante, at 916, n. 8 (suggesting that States may have flexibility in complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights Act); ante, at 1037 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that States traditionally have enjoyed a broader discretion in drawing district lines), then presumably a district drawn in a race-conscious fashion could survive only if it was as compact as the Gingles district hypothesized for purposes of stating a vote-dilution claim, and positioned where the hypothetical district would be.
If the Court ultimately were to reach such a conclusion, it would in one respect be taking a step back toward Shaw I and its suggestion that a district's shape might play an important, if not determinative role in establishing a cause of action. Such a step would, however, do much more than return to Shaw I, which suggested that a compact district would be a safe haven, but not that the district hypothesized under Gingles was the only haven. See, e. g., Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 646 ("The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions").
I refer to this step as a "possibility" deliberately. The Court in Shaw II does not go beyond an intimation to this effect, and Bush raises doubt that the Court would go so far. See ante, at 977-978 (rejecting the argument made by Justice Stevens); see also ante, at 978 ("[T]he States retain a flexibility that federal courts enforcing § 2 lack . . . . And nothing that we say today should be read as limiting 'a State's discretion to apply traditional districting princi-
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