Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996)

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Cite as: 517 U. S. 44 (1996)

Souter, J., dissenting

an intent would be exceedingly odd, it would be equally odd for this Court to recognize an intent to block the customary application of Ex parte Young without applying the rule recognized in our previous cases, which have insisted on a clear statement before assuming a congressional purpose to "affec[t] the federal balance," United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971). See also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989) ("[I]f Congress intends to alter the 'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute' ") (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S., at 242); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460-461 (1991). Our habitual caution makes sense for just the reason we mentioned in Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S., at 230-231: it is "difficult to believe that . . . Congress, taking careful stock of the state of Eleventh Amendment law, decided it would drop coy hints but stop short of making its intention manifest."

C

There is no question that by its own terms Young's indispensable rule authorizes the exercise of federal jurisdiction over respondent Chiles. Since this case does not, of course, involve retrospective relief, Edelman's limit is irrelevant, and there is no other jurisdictional limitation. Obviously, for jurisdictional purposes it makes no difference in principle whether the injunction orders an official not to act, as in Young, or requires the official to take some positive step, as in Milliken or Quern. Nothing, then, in this case renders Young unsuitable as a jurisdictional basis for determining on the merits whether petitioner is entitled to an order against a state official under general equitable doctrine. The Court does not say otherwise, and yet it refuses to apply Young. There is no adequate reason for its refusal.

No clear statement of intent to displace the doctrine of Ex parte Young occurs in IGRA, and the Court is instead

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