Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996)
Syllabus
two major political parties shall automatically appear on the general election ballot, without the need to declare their candidacy or to demonstrate their support with a nominating petition, and authorizes the two parties to determine for themselves how they will select their nominees, whether by primary, nominating convention, or some other method, the Party "act[ed] under authority" of Virginia when it picked its candidate at the convention and certified the nominee for automatic placement on the general election ballot. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 653, n. 6, 660, 663. Because the conclusion that the Party's activities fall directly within the regulation's scope is not contradicted, but is in fact supported, by this Court's narrow holding in Williams, supra, the District Court also erred when it based its dismissal of appellants' complaint on that case. Pp. 194-203. (b) The Act's language and structure compel the conclusion that § 5 of its own force covers changes such as the Party's filing fee when the electoral practice at issue is a nominating convention. This Court has consistently construed the Act to require preclearance of any change bearing on the "effectiveness" of a vote cast in a primary, special, or general election, including changes in the composition of the electorate that votes for a particular office. See, e. g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 570. By limiting the opportunity for voters to participate in the convention, the Party's filing fee undercuts their influence on the field of candidates whose names will appear on the ballot, and thus weakens the "effectiveness" of their votes cast in the general election itself. That § 5 covers nonprimary nomination methods is also supported by Whitley v. Williams, decided with Allen, supra; by the text and legislative history of § 14, which defines the terms "vote" or "voting" to include "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any . . . election," including the selection of persons for "party office"; and by the text of § 2, which bans any racially discriminatory voting qualification or prerequisite if "the political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally open to . . . [protected group] members." (Emphasis added.) Pp. 203-210. (c) Consideration of the historical background which informed the 89th Congress when it passed the Act—particularly Terry v. Adams, 345 U. S. 461, and the other "White Primary Cases," in which the Court applied the Fifteenth Amendment to strike down a succession of measures by Texas authorities to exclude minority voters from their nomination processes—confirms the conclusion that § 5 applies here. None of the reasons offered to support appellees' contention that the White Primary Cases have no bearing on the Act's proper interpretation—(1) that the Party's convention did not operate in a racially discriminatory manner; (2) that, although the Act was meant to enforce the Fifteenth
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