Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 18 (1996)

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Cite as: 517 U. S. 186 (1996)

Opinion of Stevens, J.

voting for preclearance, 28 CFR § 51.23(b) (1993), thereby eliminating this one practical obstacle. Other lower courts have subsequently required preclearance of internal party rules, even when those rules do not relate to the conduct of primary elections.20 Indeed, if the rationale of Williams were still valid, § 5 would not cover party primaries either, for the party (by hypothesis) would likewise have no means of preclearing changes. But it is firmly established— and the Party does not dispute—that changes affecting primaries carried out by political parties must be precleared.21

The District Court was therefore incorrect to base its decision on either the Attorney General's regulation or on our summary affirmance in Williams. The Party's activities fall directly within the scope of the regulation. We next conclude, based on the language and structure of the Act, and the historical background which informed the Congress that enacted it, that § 5 of its own force covers changes in electoral practices such as the Party's imposition of a filing fee for delegates to its convention.

IV

Section 5 of the Act requires preclearance of changes in "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." Section

20 See, e. g., Fortune v. Kings County Democratic Comm., 598 F. Supp. 761, 764 (EDNY 1984) (requiring preclearance of change in voting membership of county party executive committee, because those members performed a "public electoral function" in filling vacancies in nominations for state office).

21 We also note that a summary affirmance by this Court is a "rather slender reed" on which to rest future decisions. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 784-785, n. 5 (1983). "A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below, and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment." Ibid. Either of the two grounds discussed above—the State's noninvolvement or the absence of suitable administrative procedures for submission—would have sufficed for our affirmance.

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