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Opinion of Stevens, J.
Justice Thomas makes two other arguments. First, he contends that we should not defer to the Attorney General's regulation when construing the coverage of § 5. See post, at 258. The argument is surprising because our explanation of why § 5 applies to political parties places no reliance on principles of administrative deference. It is nevertheless interesting to note that the regulation has been endorsed by three successive administrations.35
son acting under color of law" to interfere with the exercise of the right to vote. See 42 U. S. C. § 1973i(a) (1988 ed.). It is quite natural, however, that Congress would draw on § 1983 when it sought to draft provisions that established individual liability for persons who violate civil rights such as the right to vote. Section 1983 was designed "to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172 (1961). Section 11(a) served exactly the same end, and therefore used similar language.
By contrast, Congress would not have looked to § 1983 to supply language for § 5 for the simple reason that § 1983 does not reach the one type of entity Congress most desired § 5 to cover: the States themselves. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58 (1989). Justice Thomas tries to avoid this problem by proposing a new, disjunctive statutory phrase that is supposedly clearer than the present § 5: " 'State or political subdivision or any person acting under color of State law.' " Post, at 265 (emphasis deleted). That concatenation of elements, however, appears in no statute ever enacted, so it is unclear why it is preferable to language that had already been construed by this Court. Furthermore, the "person acting under color of state law" locution would be simultaneously too broad and too narrow in that context. Section 5 focuses not on actions that individuals carry out, but on voting practices that organizations enact or implement. Ordinary "persons" do not create and implement voting practices. At the same time, the "plain meaning" of the word "person" does not include political parties. While "person" can be read more broadly, so can "State," as our precedents show. Finally, if "person" reached nonnatural entities, it would become partly redundant with the word "State," which the dissent itself concedes encompasses political units smaller than States. See Sheffield; Dougherty. In short, it is hardly surprising that Congress opted for the language of the Constitution rather than Justice Thomas' concocted phrase.
35 Justice Thomas is unwilling to accept our representation as to the reasoning underlying our decision; he goes on at great length about our
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