288
Thomas, J., dissenting
guaranteed that no person would be subject to unapproved voting changes. Thus, § 10 confers no rights upon individuals and its remedial scheme is limited to suits by the Attorney General. Cf. ante, at 232 (opinion of Stevens, J.).
I am unpersuaded by the maxim that Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of our "implied cause of action" jurisprudence. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 698-699; ante, at 230-231. That maxim is relevant to but one of the three factors that were established for determining the existence of private rights of action in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), and that were applied in Cannon. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 699 (considering "contemporary legal context" of statute to assess the third Cort factor, whether the legislative history reveals an intent to create a cause of action). Though we may thus look to this presumption for guidance in evaluating the history of a statute's enactment, "what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 15-16 (1979). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 575 (1979). We do this by "begin[ning] with the language of the statute itself." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, supra, at 16. In my view, § 10—which authorizes only the Attorney General to sue for relief and creates no enforceable right in any person to be free from poll taxes—precludes the inference that Congress intended the availability of implied causes of action under that section.21
Finally, the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act do not justify the judicial creation of a private cause of action
21 Nor do I think that we should imply a cause of action under § 10 simply because we have heard and decided challenges by private plaintiffs under § 2. See ante, at 232 (opinion of Stevens, J.); ante, at 240 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). We ought not base our decision in this case on the fact that we have inadvertently, and perhaps incorrectly, allowed private suits to proceed under other sections of the Act.
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