Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 19 (1996)

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Cite as: 517 U. S. 25 (1996)

Opinion of the Court

Finally, Florida points to language in Fabe, which states that the McCarran-Ferguson Act "imposes what is, in effect, a clear-statement rule" that forbids pre-emption "unless a federal statute specifically requires otherwise." 508 U. S., at 507. Florida believes that this statement in Fabe means that the Federal Statute would have to use the words "state law is pre-empted," or the like, in order to fall within the McCarran-Ferguson Act exception. We do not believe, however, that Fabe imposes any such requirement. Rather, the quoted language in Fabe was a general description of the Act's effect. It simply pointed to the existence of the clause at issue here—the exception for federal statutes that "specifically relat[e] to the business of insurance." But it did not purport authoritatively to interpret the "specifically relates" clause. That matter was not at issue in Fabe. We therefore believe that Fabe does not require us to reach a different result here.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.


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