486
Syllabus
unrelated to consumer protection, it must be reviewed with "special care" under Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 566, n. 9. It cannot survive that review because it does not satisfy even the less than strict standard that generally applies in commercial speech cases under Central Hudson, id., at 566. First, the advertising ban does not directly advance the State's substantial interest in promoting temperance. See ibid. Because a commercial speech regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose, id., at 564, the State bears the burden of showing not merely that its regulation will advance its interest, but also that it will do so "to a material degree," see, e. g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. 761, 767. In this case, therefore, the State must show that the ban will significantly reduce alcohol consumption, but has presented no evidence to suggest a significant reduction. Second, the ban is more extensive than necessary to serve its stated interest, see 447 U. S., at 566, since alternative forms of regulation that would not involve any speech restrictions—e. g., the maintenance of higher prices either by direct regulation or by increased taxation, the rationing of per capita purchases, or the use of educational campaigns focused on drinking problems—would be more likely to achieve the goal of promoting temperance. Thus, the State has failed to establish the requisite "reasonable fit" between its regulation and its goal. See, e. g., Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480. Pp. 504-508. (d) Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Part VI that the State's arguments in support of its claim that it merely exercised appropriate "legislative judgment" in determining that a price advertising ban would best promote temperance—i. e., (1) that because expert opinions as to the effectiveness of the ban "go both ways," the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the ban constituted a "reasonable choice" by the legislature; (2) that precedent requires that particular deference be accorded that legislative choice because the State could, if it chose, ban the sale of alcoholic beverages outright; and (3) that deference is appropriate because alcoholic beverages are so-called "vice" products—must be rejected. See Rubin, 514 U. S., at 482-483, n. 2. United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U. S. 418, distinguished; Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S. 328, distinguished and disavowed in part. Pp. 508-514.
Justice Scalia concluded that guidance as to what the First Amendment forbids, where the core offense of suppressing particular political ideas is not at issue, must be taken from the long accepted practices of the American people. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334, 375 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Since, however, the Court has before it no evidence as to state legislative practices regarding regula-
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