522
Opinion of Thomas, J.
in those cases. Posadas, supra, at 341-342; Edge, supra, at 425, 433-434.
The Court has at times appeared to assume that "commercial" speech could be censored in a variety of ways for any of a variety of reasons because, as was said without clear rationale in some post-Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy cases, such speech was in a "subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values," Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978); Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 478 (1989); Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U. S. 618, 623 (1995), or of "less constitutional moment," Central Hudson, supra, at 562-563, n. 5. But see Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U. S. 410, 418- 419 (1993) (rejecting this assertion); id., at 431 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (same). I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that "commercial" speech is of "lower value" than "noncommercial" speech. Indeed, some historical materials suggest to the contrary. See, e. g., ante, at 495-496 (citing Franklin's Apology for Printers); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1878) (dictum that Congress could not, consistent with freedom of the press, prevent the circulation of lottery advertising through methods other than the United States mail); see also In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 110, 134-135 (1892) (continuing to assume that freedom of the press prevents Congress from prohibiting circulation of newspapers containing lottery advertisements); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288, 315 (1913) (same); see generally Brief for American Advertising Federation et al. as Amici Curiae 12-24 (citing authorities for propositions that commercial activity and advertising were integral to life in colonial America and that Framers' political philosophy equated liberty and property and did not distinguish between commercial and noncommercial messages). Nor do I believe that the only explanations that the Court has ever advanced for treating "commercial" speech differently from other speech can justify restricting "commercial" speech in
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