Cite as: 517 U. S. 654 (1996)
Opinion of the Court
Service of process, we have come to understand, is properly regarded as a matter discrete from a court's jurisdiction to adjudicate a controversy of a particular kind,19 or against a particular individual or entity.20 Its essential purpose is auxiliary, a purpose distinct from the substantive matters aired in the precedent on which the dissent, wrenching cases from context, extensively relies—who may sue,21 on what
claims,22 for what relief,23 within what limitations period.24
of limitations (46 U. S. C. App. § 745) has run, serve the United States Attorney and the Attorney General "forthwith," and by those steps, gain the benefit of the original complaint filing date through the application of the "relation back" provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). See Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F. 2d 1431, 1435-1437 (CA9 1983) (allowing such relation back when plaintiff amended a complaint, brought four years earlier under the Federal Tort Claims Act, to assert instead a claim under the Suits in Admiralty Act); cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 38 (counsel for United States acknowledged that Henderson, who filed his complaint April 8, 1993, could have filed a fresh complaint anytime before August 27 of that year (the date the 2-year statute of limitations expired), and served it "forthwith," thereby avoiding the loss of his claim).
19 I. e., subject-matter jurisdiction. See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522, p. 78 (2d ed. 1984); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11, p. 108 (1982) (defining "subject matter jurisdiction" as the "authority [of the court] to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the action").
20 On relationships sufficient to support "jurisdiction over persons," see generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 27-32, 35-44, 47-52 (1971 and Supp. 1989). See also 4 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1064.
21 See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941) (Tucker Act, allowing contract claims against United States, does not authorize joinder of claims between private parties).
22 See United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 39 (1992) (Bankruptcy Code § 106(c) does not waive the Government's sovereign immunity from bankruptcy trustee's monetary relief claims).
23 See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 310, 323 (1986) (Government's waiver of immunity from suit for damages does not waive immunity with respect to interest).
24 See, e. g., United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527, 534, n. 7 (1995); Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461
671
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