United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 2 (1996)

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844

UNITED STATES v. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

MACHINES CORP.

Syllabus

hand, expressly prohibits Congress from laying any tax or duty on exports. These textual disparities strongly suggest that shifts in the Court's view of the dormant Commerce Clause's scope cannot govern Export Clause interpretation. Cf. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U. S. 69, 75-76. Pp. 850-853. (c) While one may question Thames & Mersey's finding that a tax on policies insuring exports is functionally the same as a tax on exportation itself, the Government apparently has chosen not to do so here. Under the principles that animate the policy of stare decisis, the Court declines to overrule Thames & Mersey's longstanding precedent, which has caused no uncertainty in commercial export transactions, on a theory not argued by the parties. Pp. 854-856. (d) This Court's recent Import-Export Clause cases do not require that Thames & Mersey be overruled. Meaningful textual differences that should not be overlooked exist between the Export Clause and the Import-Export Clause. In finding the assessments in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U. S. 276, and Department of Revenue of Wash. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U. S. 734, valid, the Court recognized that the Import-Export Clause's absolute ban on "Imposts or Duties" is not a ban on every tax. Because impost and duty are thus narrower terms than tax, a particular state assessment might be beyond the Import-Export Clause's reach, while an identical federal assessment might be subject to the Export Clause. The word "Tax" has a common, and usually expansive, meaning that should not be ignored. The Clauses were also intended to serve different goals. The Government's policy argument—that the Framers intended the Export Clause to narrowly alleviate the fear of northern repression through taxation of southern exports by prohibiting only discriminatory taxes—cannot be squared with the Clause's broad language. The better reading is that the Framers sought to alleviate their concerns by completely denying to Congress the power to tax exports at all. See Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283. Pp. 857-861. (e) Even assuming that Michelin and Washington Stevedoring govern the Export Clause inquiry here, those holdings do not interpret the Import-Export Clause to permit assessment of nondiscriminatory taxes on imports and exports in transit. Pp. 861-862. 59 F. 3d 1234, affirmed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 863. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

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