Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 25 (1996)

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Cite as: 517 U. S. 899 (1996)

Stevens, J., dissenting

pause. Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 573-574 (1992).3

Even if an objection to a State's decision to forgo color-blind districting is cognizable under some constitutional provision, I do not understand why that provision should be the Equal Protection Clause. In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561 (1964), we were careful to point out that "[a] predominant consideration in determining whether a State's legislative apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative of rights asserted under the Equal Protection Clause is that the rights allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature." In addition, in Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971), we explained that racially motivated legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause only when the challenged legislation "affect[s] blacks differently from whites."

To be sure, as some commentators have noted, we have permitted generalized claims of harm resulting from state-sponsored messages to secure standing under the Establishment Clause. Pildes & Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 483, 499- 524 (1993). It would be quite strange, however, to confer similarly broad standing under the Equal Protection Clause because that Clause protects against wrongs which by definition burden some persons but not others.

Here, of course, it appears that no individual has been burdened more than any other. The supposedly insidious messages that Shaw I contends will follow from extremely irreg-3 There, a majority of the Court stated that "[w]e have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 573-574.

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