Cite as: 518 U. S. 267 (1996)
Opinion of Stevens, J.
criminal in nature and therefore subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Ante, at 288. The test was imported by the 89 Firearms Court from cases involving civil in personam penalties. See 465 U. S., at 362 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 398-399 (1938), and United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248 (1980)). In the context of these cases and the precedents bearing upon them, I am not sure the test adds much to the clear rule of Various Items that civil in rem forfeiture of property involved in a crime is not punishment subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause. As to the first prong of the test, any in rem proceeding is civil. As to the second prong, so long as forfeiture hinges on the property's use in a crime, there will always be the remedial purpose the Court identifies of preventing property owners from allowing their goods to be used for illegal purposes, ante, at 290. I acknowledge 89 Firearms to be precedent, however, and, because the Court's application of the test is consistent with Various Items, I join its opinion in full.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.
In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits successive prosecution, not successive punishment. See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767, 798 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Civil forfeiture proceedings of the sort at issue here are not criminal prosecutions, even under the standard of Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 164 (1963), and United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-251 (1980).
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
The question the Court poses is whether civil forfeitures constitute "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because the numerous federal statutes authorizing forfeitures cover such a wide variety of situations, it is quite
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