448
Scalia, J., dissenting
altogether. 356 U. S., at 537. That holding in no way requires us to consult the Amendment's second clause to determine the standard of review for a district court's application of state substantive law.
My disagreement is tempered, however, because the majority carefully avoids defining too strictly the abuse-of-discretion standard it announces. To the extent that the majority relies only on "practical reasons" for its conclusion that the Court of Appeals should give some weight to the District Court's assessment in determining whether state substantive law has been properly applied, ante, at 438, I do not disagree with its analysis.
As a matter of federal-court administration, we have recognized in other contexts the need for according some deference to the lower court's resolution of legal, yet fact-intensive, questions. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S., at 699; Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 558, n. 1 (1988). Indeed, it is a familiar, if somewhat circular, maxim that deems an error of law an abuse of discretion.
In the end, therefore, my disagreement with the label that the majority attaches to the standard of appellate review should not obscure the far more fundamental point on which we agree. Whatever influence the Seventh Amendment may be said to exert, Erie requires federal appellate courts sitting in diversity to apply "the damage-control standard state law supplies." Ante, at 438.
IV
Because I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and because I do not agree that the Seventh Amendment in any respect influences the proper analysis of the question presented, I respectfully dissent.
Justice Scalia, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
Today the Court overrules a longstanding and well-reasoned line of precedent that has for years prohibited fed-
Page: Index Previous 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007