Cite as: 518 U. S. 470 (1996)
Opinion of the Court
Such a comparison mandates a conclusion that the Lohrs' common-law claims are not pre-empted by the federal labeling and manufacturing requirements. The generality of those requirements make this quite unlike a case in which the Federal Government has weighed the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations should be resolved in a particular case or set of cases, and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate on manufacturers or producers. Rather, the federal requirements reflect important but entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally, not the sort of concerns regarding a specific device or field of device regulation that the statute or regulations were designed to protect from potentially contradictory state requirements.
Similarly, the general state common-law requirements in this suit were not specifically developed "with respect to" medical devices. Accordingly, they are not the kinds of requirements that Congress and the FDA feared would impede the ability of federal regulators to implement and enforce specific federal requirements. The legal duty that is the predicate for the Lohrs' negligent manufacturing claim is the general duty of every manufacturer to use due care to avoid foreseeable dangers in its products. Similarly, the predicate for the failure to warn claim is the general duty to inform users and purchasers of potentially dangerous items of the risks involved in their use. These general obligations are no more a threat to federal requirements than would be a state-law duty to comply with local fire prevention regula-obligation—the duty not to deceive." Id., at 528-529. The general common-law duty "not to make fraudulent statements" was not within the specific category of requirements or prohibitions based on smoking and health imposed under state law "with respect to the advertising or promotion" of cigarettes that were pre-empted by the 1969 statute. Id., at 529.
If anything, the language of the MDA's pre-emption statute and its counterpart regulations require an even more searching inquiry into the relationship between the federal requirement and the state requirement at issue than was true under the statute in Cipollone.
501
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