Cite as: 518 U. S. 604 (1996)
Opinion of Thomas, J.
aimed at the prevention of corruption will be sustained against First Amendment attack.10 Just as some of the monetary limits in the Buckley line of cases were held to be invalid because the Government interest in stemming corruption was inadequate under the circumstances to justify the restrictions on speech, so too is § 441a(d)(3) invalid.11
The Government asserts that the purpose of § 441a(d)(3) is to prevent the corruption of candidates and elected representatives by party officials. The Government does not explain precisely what it means by "corruption," however; 12 the
closest thing to an explanation the Government offers is that "corruption" is " 'the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office.' " Brief for Respondent 35 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 25). We so defined
10 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 45-47 (striking down limits on independent expenditures because the "advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption"); Federal Election Comm'n v. MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, 263 (1986) (invalidating caps on campaign expenditures by incorporated political associations because spending by such groups "does not pose [any] threat" of corruption); Federal Election Comm'n v. NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 498 (striking down limits on independent expenditures by political action committees because "a quid pro quo for improper commitments" in that context was a "hypothetical possibility"); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U. S. 290, 297 (1981) (stating that "Buckley does not support limitations on contributions to committees formed to favor or oppose ballot measures" because anticorruption rationale is inapplicable); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 790 (1978) (concluding that limits on referendum speech by corporations violate First Amendment because "[t]he risk of corruption . . . simply is not present").
11 While Justice Breyer chides me for taking the position that I would not adhere to Buckley, see ante, at 626, and suggests that my approach to this case is thus insufficiently "cautiou[s]," ibid., he ignores this Part of my opinion, in which I explain why limits on coordinated expenditures are unconstitutional even under the Buckley line of precedent.
12 Nor, for that matter, does Justice Breyer explain what sorts of quid pro quos a party could extract from a candidate. Cf. ante, at 615.
645
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