772
Stevens, J., concurring
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). There is no reason to conclude otherwise here.
Finally, § 10(a) cannot be assailed on the somewhat broader ground that it nevertheless reduces the programming available to the adult population to what is suitable for children. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957); post, at 807 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Section 10(a) serves only to ensure that the newly created access right will not require operators to expose children to more unsuitable communications than would otherwise be the case. It is thus far different in both purpose and effect from the provision at issue in Butler, which criminalized the sale of certain books. 352 U. S., at 381.
In sum, § 10(a) constitutes a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral
limitation on a federally created access right for certain cable programmers. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to this provision.
II
As both Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy have explained, the public, educational, and governmental access channels that are regulated by § 10(c) are not creations of the Federal Government. They owe their existence to contracts forged between cable operators and local cable franchising authorities. Ante, at 734, 760-762 (opinion of Breyer, J.); post, at 788-790, 791-794 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
As their name reflects, so-called PEG channels are subject to a variety of local governmental controls and regulations that—apart from any federal requirement—may result either in a prohibition or a requirement that certain types of programs be carried. Ante, at 761-763 (opinion of Breyer, J.) Presumably, as Justice Breyer explains, the local authorities seldom permit programming of the type described by § 10(c) to air. Ante, at 762-763.
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