902
Opinion of Souter, J.
trary to the public interest. The contracts between the savings and loan owners when they acquired failing institutions in the early 1980's are not contracts written in stone." 135 Cong. Rec., at 12077.49
This evidence of intense concern with contracts like the ones before us suffices to show that FIRREA had the substantial effect of releasing the Government from its own contractual obligations. Congress obviously expected FIRREA to have such an effect, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary we accept its factual judgment that this would be so.50 Nor is Congress's own judgment neutralized by the fact, emphasized by the Government, that FIRREA did not formally target particular transactions. Legislation can almost always be written in a formally gen-49 See also House Report, at 545 (Supplemental Views of Reps. Schumer, Morrison, Roukema, Gonzalez, Vento, McMillen, and Hoagland) ("[A]n overriding public policy would be jeopardized by the continued adherence to arrangements which were blithely entered into by the FSLIC"); 135 Cong. Rec., at 12062 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez) ("[I]n blunt terms, the Bank Board and FSLIC insurance fund managers entered into bad deals— I might even call them steals"); id., at 11789 (statement of Rep. Saxton) ("In short[,] goodwill agreements were a mistake and as the saying goes . . . 'Two wrongs don't make a right' "). These proponents defeated two amendments to FIRREA, proposed by Reps. Quillen and Hyde, which would have given thrifts that had received capital forbearances from thrift regulators varying degrees of protection from the new rules. See Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, supra, at 616- 617; see also 135 Cong. Rec. 12068 (1989) (statement of Rep. Price) ("[T]he proponents of [the Hyde] amendment say a 'Deal is a Deal' . . . . But to claim that Congress can never change a regulator's decision . . . in the future is simply not tenable"); Franklin Federal Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, supra, at 1340-1341 (reviewing the House debate and concluding that "[n]obody expressed the view that FIRREA did not abrogate forbearance agreements regarding supervisory goodwill" (emphasis in original)).
50 Despite the claims of the dissent, our test does not turn upon "some sort of legislative intent," post, at 933. Rather, we view Congress's expectation that the Government's own obligations would be heavily affected simply as good evidence that this was, indeed, the case.
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