Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 13 (1996) (per curiam)

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950

PENNSYLVANIA v. LABRON

Stevens, J., dissenting

tion whether respect for the reasoning, independence, and resources of the Pennsylvania court will be advanced by today's decision.

While Kilgore relies more explicitly on the Federal Constitution than the other two decisions, it decided the identical issue that was decided in Labron and White only three days before those decisions issued. The reference to the Federal Constitution upon which the Court rests its jurisdiction— only one of two references to federal law—must be read in the context of the other two decisions, each of which relied heavily upon the Commonwealth's own Constitution. In light of Labron and White, the judgment in Kilgore will almost certainly remain the same on remand. In such a circumstance, the rationales supporting the rule of Michigan v. Long simply do not support the decision to reverse. The petition in Kilgore should simply be denied.

On many prior occasions, I have noted the unfortunate effects of the rule of Michigan v. Long. See, e. g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 266-267 (1989) (concurring opinion); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 689-708 (1986) (dissenting opinion); Montana v. Hall, 481 U. S. 400, 411 (1987) (per curiam) (dissenting opinion); Ponte v. Real, 471 U. S. 491, 501-503 (1985) (opinion concurring in part); see also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 24, 31-34 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Because the state-law ground supporting these judgments is so much clearer than has been true on most prior occasions, see n. 5, supra, these decisions exacerbate those effects to a nearly intolerable degree. Particularly in light of my understanding of this Court's primary role—"to protect the rights of the individual that are embodied in the Federal Constitution," Harris, 489 U. S., at 267—the decision to summarily reverse state decisions resting tenuously at best on federal grounds is imprudent and entirely inconsistent "with the sound administration of this Court's discretionary docket." Ponte, 471 U. S., at 502-503.

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