Cite as: 519 U. S. 102 (1996)
Opinion of the Court
"far more precious than any property right." 455 U. S., at 758-759.
Although both Lassiter and Santosky yielded divided opinions, the Court was unanimously of the view that "the interest of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 455 U. S., at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It was also the Court's unanimous view that "[f]ew consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties." Id., at 787.
V
Guided by this Court's precedent on an indigent's access to judicial processes in criminal and civil cases, and on proceedings to terminate parental status, we turn to the classification question this case presents: Does the Fourteenth Amendment require Mississippi to accord M. L. B. access to an appeal—available but for her inability to advance required costs—before she is forever branded unfit for affiliation with her children? Respondents urge us to classify M. L. B.'s case with the generality of civil cases, in which indigent persons have no constitutional right to proceed in forma pauperis. See supra, at 114-116. M. L. B., on the other hand, maintains that the accusatory state action she is trying to fend off 12 is barely distinguishable from criminal condemnation in view of the magnitude and permanence of the loss she faces. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, 50, 55 (1967) (resisting "feeble enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience," and holding that Fifth Amendment's safeguard against self-incrimination applies in juvenile proceedings). See also Santosky, 455 U. S., at 756, 760 (recognizing stigmatic effect of parental status termination decree: "[I]t entails a judicial determination that [a parent is] unfit to raise [her] own children."). For the purpose at hand, M. L. B.
12 See supra, at 116, n. 8.
119
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