324
Opinion of the Court
apprenticeship or other training programs." § 3(1), 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1). The question thus presented to us is whether California's prevailing wage statute "relate[s] to" that "employee welfare benefit plan" within the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption clause.
Since shortly after its enactment, we have endeavored with some regularity to interpret and apply the "unhelpful text" of ERISA's pre-emption provision. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. S. 645, 656 (1995). We have long acknowledged that ERISA's pre-emption provision is "clearly expansive." Id., at 655. It has
"a 'broad scope,' Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 739 (1985), and an 'expansive sweep,' Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 47 (1987); and . . . it is 'broadly worded,' Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U. S. 133, 138 (1990), 'deliberately expansive,' Pilot Life, supra, at 46, and 'conspicuous for its breadth,' [FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U. S. 52, 58 (1990)]." Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 384 (1992).
Our efforts at applying the provision have yielded a two-part inquiry: A "law 'relate[s] to' a covered employee benefit plan for purposes of § 514(a) 'if it [1] has a connection with or [2] reference to such a plan.' " District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U. S. 125, 129 (1992) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 96-97 (1983)). Under the latter inquiry, we have held pre-empted a law that "impos[ed] requirements by reference to [ERISA] covered programs," Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, supra, at 130- 131; a law that specifically exempted ERISA plans from an otherwise generally applicable garnishment provision, Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 828, n. 2, 829-830 (1988); and a common-law cause of action premised on the existence of an ERISA plan,
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