Cite as: 519 U. S. 465 (1997)
Opinion of the Court
concerning their respective authority to regulate transactions on an exchange. See Snider § 10.24. The amendment made no change in the law applicable to off-exchange trading. Although these "dicta" are consistent with the position that the CFTC advocates, they shed no light on the intent of the authors of the Treasury Amendment that had been adopted eight years earlier. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 839-840 (1988).14
V
Underlying the statutory construction question before us, we recognize that there is an important public policy dispute—with substantial arguments favoring each side. Pe-14 Though the CFTC's brief disclaims any need for it, Brief for CFTC 48, at oral argument the Commission requested for the first time that we give deference to its interpretation of the Treasury Amendment as the agency "charged with administering" it. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 739 (1996); Tr. of Oral Arg. 54; see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). If Chevron principles were applicable, we are unsure that the CFTC's position would be the one owed deference. As the Commission concedes, Brief for CFTC 25, the Treasury Department has taken a quite different view of the statute—one consonant with the interpretation set forth here—to which petitioners argue deference is owed if Chevron is invoked. A reasonable argument could be made that Congress intended to charge Treasury, rather than the Commission, with administering the dimensions of the aptly named Treasury Amendment, which was specifically enacted at the behest of Treasury to confine the CFTC's activities. Cf. Smiley, 517 U. S., at 740-741 (explaining that Chevron deference arises out of background presumptions of congressional intent); Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U. S. 144, 157-158 (1991) (allocating power "authoritatively to interpret . . . regulations" after assessing "available indicia of legislative intent"). We need not "resolve the difficult issues regarding deference which would be lurking in other circumstances." Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 477 (1992). Because "the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress' intention" to include foreign currency options within the Treasury Amendment's exemption, administrative deference is improper. Dole v. Steel-workers, 494 U. S. 26, 42 (1990).
479
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