Cite as: 519 U. S. 61 (1996)
Syllabus
578, and a plaintiff is not required to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b) in order to avoid waiving whatever ultimate appeal right he may have. Having preserved his objection, Lewis urges that ultimate satisfaction of the subject-matter jurisdiction requirement ought not swallow up antecedent statutory violations. Lewis' arguments in support of this position are hardly meritless, but they run up against an overriding consideration. Once a diversity case has been tried in federal court, with rules of decision supplied by state law under the regime of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming. Cf., e. g., Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 836. This view is in harmony with a main theme of the removal scheme devised by Congress, which calls for expeditious superintendence by district courts. In this case, no jurisdictional defect lingered through judgment in the District Court. To wipe out the adjudication postjudgment, and return to state court a case now satisfying all federal jurisdictional requirements, would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with the fair and unprotracted administration of justice. Pp. 73-77. (d) Lewis' prediction that rejection of his petition will provide state-court defendants with an enormous incentive to attempt unlawful removals rests on an assumption this Court does not indulge—that federal district courts generally will not comprehend, or will balk at applying, the removal rules Congress has prescribed. The prediction furthermore assumes defendants' readiness to gamble that any jurisdictional defect, for example, the absence of complete diversity, will first escape detection, then disappear prior to judgment. This Court is satisfied that the well-advised defendant will foresee the likely outcome of an unwarranted removal—a swift and nonreviewable remand order, see §§ 1447(c), (d), attended by the displeasure of a district court whose authority has been improperly invoked. Pp. 77-78.
Reversed and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Kenneth S. Geller argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael R. Feagley, John E. Muench, Charles Rothfeld, Leslie W. Morris II, James B. Buda, and William F. Maready.
63
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007