152
Opinion of the Court
Petitioners do identify some actual differences between preparole and Oklahoma's version of parole, but these do no better at convincing us that preparole was different from parole as we understood it in Morrissey. As petitioners point out, participation in the Program was ordered by the Board, while the Governor conferred parole. In this regard, preparole was different from parole in Oklahoma; but it was no different from parole as we described it in Morrissey. See 408 U. S., at 477-478. In addition, preparolees who "escape[d]" from the Program could be prosecuted as though they had escaped from prison, see Okla. Stat., Tit. 57, § 365(F) (Supp. 1990), while it appears that parolees who "escaped" from parole were subject not to further prosecution, but to revocation of parole, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 11. That the punishment for failure to abide by one of the conditions of his liberty was potentially greater for a preparolee than for a parolee did not itself diminish that liberty. Petitioners also note that a preparolee could not leave Oklahoma under any circumstances, App. 7, while a parolee could leave Oklahoma with his parole officer's permission, App. to Brief for Respondent 27a. This minor difference in a released prisoner's ability to travel did not, we think, alter the fundamentally parole-like nature of the Program.4
III
We conclude that the Program, as it existed when respondent was released, was a kind of parole as we understood paof respondent's release identify no such absolute discretion, and petitioners
point to nothing to support their contention.
4 A comparison of the conditions of preparole of which respondent was informed, App. 7-9, and those of which a roughly contemporary parolee would have been informed, App. to Brief for Respondent 27a-30a, reveals that—except for the travel and "escape" provisions—the two sets of conditions were essentially identical.
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