Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 28 (1997)

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Cite as: 520 U. S. 180 (1997)

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

tising revenue), and cable systems had increasing incentives to drop local broadcasters in favor of cable programmers (whether affiliated or not). See Noll Declaration ¶¶ 29-31 (App. 1018-1020). The vertical integration of the cable industry also continued, so by 1994, MSO's serving about 70 percent of the Nation's cable subscribers held equity interests in cable programmers. See In re Implementation of Section 19 of Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report, 9 FCC Rcd 7442, 7526, ¶ 167, and nn. 455, 457 (1994); id., App. G, Tables 9-10; Top 100 MSO's as of October 1, 1994 (DAE Vol. VII.K, Exh. 266); see also JSCR ¶¶ 199, 204 (App. 1334, 1336). The FTC study the dissent cites, post, at 242, takes a skeptical view of the potential for cable systems to engage in anticompetitive behavior, but concedes the risk of anticompetitive carriage denials is "most plausible" when "the cable system's franchise area is large relative to the local area served by the affected broadcast station," Reply Comment of FTC, at 20 (App. 177), and when "a system's penetration rate is both high and relatively unresponsive to the system's carriage decisions," id., at 18 (App. 175). That describes "precisely what is happening" as large cable operators expand their control over individual markets through clustering. Second Meek Declaration ¶ 35 (App. 1867). As they do so, they are better able to sell their own reach to potential advertisers, and to limit the access of broadcast competitors by denying them access to all or substantially all the cable homes in the market area. Ibid.; accord, Noll Declaration ¶ 24 (App. 1015).

This is not a case in which we are called upon to give our best judgment as to the likely economic consequences of certain financial arrangements or business structures, or to assess competing economic theories and predictive judgments, as we would in a case arising, say, under the antitrust laws. "Statutes frequently require courts to make policy judgments. The Sherman Act, for example, requires courts to delve deeply into the theory of economic organization."

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