520us1$41H 05-14-98 09:56:54 PAGES OPINPGT
Cite as: 520 U. S. 292 (1997)
Per Curiam
mined that the notification would not be in the minor's best interests. The court's conclusion was based on its analysis of our decisions in Bellotti v. Baird, supra, and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502 (1990).
In Bellotti, we struck down a statute requiring a minor to obtain the consent of both parents before having an abortion, subject to a judicial bypass provision, because the judicial bypass provision was too restrictive, unconstitutionally burdening a minor's right to an abortion. 443 U. S., at 647 (plurality opinion); id., at 655-656 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The Court's principal opinion explained that a constitutional parental consent statute must contain a bypass provision that meets four criteria: (i) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make the abortion decision independently; (ii) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that the abortion would be in her best interests; (iii) ensure the minor's anonymity; and (iv) provide for expeditious bypass procedures. Id., at 643-644 (plurality opinion). See also Akron, 497 U. S., at 511-513 (restating the four requirements). In Akron, we upheld a statute requiring a minor to notify
one parent before having an abortion, subject to a judicial bypass provision. We declined to decide whether a parental notification statute must include some sort of bypass provision to be constitutional. Id., at 510. Instead, we held that this bypass provision satisfied the four Bellotti criteria required for bypass provisions in parental consent statutes, and that a fortiori it satisfied any criteria that might be required for bypass provisions in parental notification statutes. Critically for the case now before us, the judicial bypass provision we examined in Akron was substantively indistinguishable from both the Montana judicial bypass provision at issue here and the Nevada provision at issue in Glick. See 497 U. S., at 508 (summarizing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.85 (1995)). The judicial bypass provision in Akron al-
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