Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 37 (1997)

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Cite as: 520 U. S. 397 (1997)

Breyer, J., dissenting

Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F. 3d 1421, 1429-1434 (CA3 1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1103 (1995) (Lanham Act); American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U. S. 556 (1982) (Sherman Act); United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U. S. 121, 124-125 (1958) (criminal statute). See also Tuttle, supra, at 835 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Second, Monell's basic effort to distinguish between vicarious liability and liability derived from "policy or custom" has produced a body of law that is neither readily understandable nor easy to apply. Today's case provides a good example. The District Court in this case told the jury it must find (1) Sheriff Moore's screening "so likely to result in violations of constitutional rights" that he could "reasonably [be] said to have been deliberately indifferent to the constitutional needs of the Plaintiff" and (2) that the "inadequate hiring . . . policy directly caused the Plaintiff's injury." App. 123a (emphasis added). This instruction comes close to repeating this Court's language in Canton v. Harris. In Canton, the Court said (of the city's failure to train officers in the use of deadly force):

"[I]n light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." 489 U. S., at 390 (emphasis added).

The majority says that the District Court and the Court of Appeals did not look closely enough at the specific facts of this case. It also adds that the harm must be a "plainly obvious consequence" of the "decision to hire" Burns. Ante, at 411. But why elaborate Canton's instruction in this way? The Court's verbal formulation is slightly different; and that being so, a lawyer or judge will ignore the Court's precise

433

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