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of tribal authority by treaty or statute. See 450 U. S., at 557-563. Read in context, the Court's statement in Iowa Mutual, 480 U. S., at 18, that "[c]ivil jurisdiction over [the] activities [of non-Indians on reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts," addresses only situations in which tribes possess authority to regulate nonmembers' activities. As to nonmembers, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction, absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction. Pp. 448-453. (c) It is unavailing to argue, as petitioners do, that Montana does not govern this case because the land underlying the accident scene is held in trust for the Three Affiliated Tribes and their members. Petitioners are correct that Montana and the cases following its instruction—Bren-dale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408, and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679—all involved alienated, non-Indian-owned reservation land. However, the right-of-way North Dakota acquired for its highway renders the 6.59-mile stretch here at issue equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to such alienated, non-Indian land. The right-of-way was granted to facilitate public access to a federal water resource project, forms part of the State's highway, and is open to the public. Traffic on the highway is subject to the State's control. The granting instrument details only one specific reservation to Indian landowners, the right to construct necessary crossings, and the Tribes expressly reserved no other right to exercise dominion or control over the right-of-way. Rather, they have consented to, and received payment for, the State's use of the stretch at issue, and so long as that stretch is maintained as part of the State's highway, they cannot assert a landowner's right to occupy and exclude. Pp. 454-456. (d) Petitioners refer to no treaty or federal statute authorizing the Three Affiliated Tribes to entertain highway-accident tort suits of the kind Fredericks commenced against A-1 and Stockert. Nor have they shown that Fredericks' tribal-court action qualifies under either of the exceptions to Montana's general rule. The tortious conduct alleged by Fredericks does not fit within the first exception for "activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements," 450 U. S., at 565, particularly when measured against the conduct at issue in the cases cited by Montana, id., at 565-566, as fitting within the exception, Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384; Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950; and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 152- 154. This dispute is distinctly nontribal in nature, arising between two non-Indians involved in a run-of-the-mill highway accident. Although
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