494
Opinion of Breyer, J.
Of course, the constitutional language also applies to § 5's prohibition that rests upon "effects." The Court assumes, in its discussion of "effects," that the § 5 word "effects" does not now embody a purely constitutional test, whether or not it ever did so. See ante, at 478; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 173, 177 (1980). And that fact, here, is beside the point. The separate argument about the meaning of the word "effect" concerns how far beyond the Constitution's requirements Congress intended that word to reach. The argument about "purpose" is simply whether Congress intended the word to reach as far as the Constitution itself, embodying those purposes that, in relevant context, the Constitution itself would forbid. I can find nothing in the Court's discussion that shows that Congress intended to restrict the meaning of the statutory word "purpose" short of what the Constitution itself requires. And the Court has previously expressly indicated that minority vote dilution is a harm that § 5 guards against. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969).
Consider a hypothetical example that will clarify the precise legal question here at issue. Suppose that a covered jurisdiction is choosing between two new voting plans, A and B. Neither plan is retrogressive. Plan A violates every traditional districting principle, but from the perspective of minority representation, it maintains the status quo, thereby meeting the "effects" test of § 5. See ante, at 478-479. Plan B is basically consistent with traditional districting principles and it also creates one or two new majority-minority districts (in a State where the number of such districts is significantly less than proportional to minority voting age population). Suppose further that the covered jurisdiction adopts Plan A. Without any other proposed evidence or justification, ordinary principles of logic and human experience suggest that the jurisdiction would likely have adopted Plan A with "the purpose . . . of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." § 1973c. It is reason-
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