Cite as: 520 U. S. 548 (1997)
Opinion of the Court
"circumstance" that Papai had worked for Harbor Tug on 12 occasions during the 21/2 months before his injury "may in itself provide a sufficient connection" to Harbor Tug's vessels to establish seaman status. Ibid.
Judge Poole dissented from the majority's holding that there was a triable issue as to Papai's seaman status. He recognized that Chandris held out the possibility of being a seaman without a substantial connection to a particular vessel in navigation, provided one nevertheless had the required connection to " 'an identifiable group of such vessels.' " 67 F. 3d, at 209 (quoting 515 U. S., at 368). Judge Poole said, however, it would be a mistake to view Chandris as holding that, for seaman-status purposes, a "group may be identified simply as those vessels on which a sailor sails, not just those of a particular employer or controlling entity. . . . Th[e majority's holding] renders the 'identifiable group' or 'fleet' requirement a nullity." 67 F. 3d, at 209 (citation omitted). Judge Poole also noted that the majority's position conflicted with that of the Fifth Circuit (en banc) and of a Third Circuit panel. Ibid. (citing Barrett v. Chevron, U. S. A., Inc., 781 F. 2d 1067 (CA5 1986) (en banc); Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co., 26 F. 3d 1247 (CA3 1994)); see also Johnson v. Continental Grain Co., 58 F. 3d 1232 (CA8 1995); but see Fisher v. Nichols, 81 F. 3d 319, 323 (CA2 1996) (rejecting common ownership or control requirement).
We granted certiorari, 518 U. S. 1055 (1996), and now reverse.
II
The LHWCA, a maritime workers' compensation scheme, excludes from its coverage "a master or member of a crew of any vessel," 33 U. S. C. § 902(3)(G). These masters and crewmembers are the seamen entitled to sue for damages under the Jones Act. Chandris, 515 U. S., at 355-358. In other words, the LHWCA and the Jones Act are "mutually exclusive." Id., at 355-356.
553
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007