592
Opinion of the Court
Finally, the Town argues that its discriminatory tax exemption scheme falls within the "market-participant" exception. As we explained in New Energy Co.: "That doctrine differentiates between a State's acting in its distinctive governmental capacity, and a State's acting in the more general capacity of a market participant; only the former is subject to the limitations of the negative Commerce Clause." 486 U. S., at 277. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204, 208 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S., at 436-437; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S., at 810.
In Alexandria Scrap we concluded that the State of Maryland had, in effect, entered the market for abandoned automobile hulks as a purchaser because it was using state funds to provide bounties for their removal from Maryland streets and junkyards. Id., at 809-810. In Reeves, the State of South Dakota similarly participated in the market for cement as a seller of the output of the cement plant that it had owned and operated for many years. 447 U. S., at 431-432. And in White, the city of Boston had participated in the construction industry by funding certain projects. 460 U. S., at 205-206. These three cases stand for the proposition that, for purposes of analysis under the dormant Commerce Clause, a State acting in its proprietary capacity as a purtion from the Illinois inheritance tax because the corporate legatee was not incorporated in Illinois. In this case, the petitioner is a Maine corporation, and the validity of the portion of the Maine statute that denies the exemption to out-of-state corporations is not at issue. Moreover, unlike the situation in Board of Ed. of Ky., in which none of the charitable activities of the legatee were performed in Illinois, all of the benefits of attending petitioner's camp in Maine are "bestowed within her borders." Id., at 563. While the dictum that Justice Scalia quotes, post, at 606, is consistent with his analysis, it does not purport to address the applicability of the dormant Commerce Clause to charities in general, to resident charities, or to nonresident charities that provide benefits for both residents and nonresidents.
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