United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 10 (1997)

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Cite as: 520 U. S. 670 (1997)

Opinion of the Court

reason" standard would actually apply. We see no indication in the Rules to suggest that Rule 32(e) can be eviscerated in this manner, and the Court of Appeals did not point to one.

Respondent defends this cramped understanding of Rule 32(e) by arguing that the "fair and just reason" standard was meant to apply only to "fully accepted" guilty pleas, as opposed to "conditionally accepted" pleas—i. e., pleas that are accepted but later withdrawn under Rule 11(e)(4) if the plea agreement is rejected. He points out that the "fair and just reason" standard was derived from dictum in our pre-Rules opinion in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 224 (1927), see Advisory Committee's Notes on Rule 32, 18 U. S. C. App., p. 794, and that Kercheval spoke of a guilty plea as a final, not a conditional, act, see 274 U. S., at 223 ("A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence"). He then argues that since the Rule 32(e) standard was derived from Kercheval, the Rule must also have incorporated the Kercheval view that a guilty plea is a final, unconditional act. Thus, since his guilty plea was conditioned on the District Court accepting the plea agreement, the Rule simply does not apply.

We reject this somewhat tortuous argument. When the "fair and just reason" standard was added in 1983, the Rules already provided that the district court could defer decision on whether to accept the plea agreement, that it could then reject the agreement, and that the defendant would then be able to withdraw his guilty plea. Guilty pleas made pursuant to plea agreements were thus already subject to this sort of condition subsequent. Yet neither the new Rule 32(e) nor the Advisory Committee's Notes accompanying it attempted to draw a distinction between "fully accepted" and "conditionally accepted" guilty pleas. Instead, the Rule simply

679

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