878
Opinion of the Court
fault). Those damages included damages for the loss of the equipment that Madruga had added after the initial purchase of the ship.
The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court should not have awarded damages for the added equipment. Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F. 3d 1432, 1445 (1995). A majority noted that the equipment, though added by Madruga, was part of the ship when Madruga resold the ship to Saratoga Fishing, and, for that reason, the majority held, the added equipment was part of the defective product that itself caused the harm. Applying East River's distinction between the product that itself caused the harm and "other property," the majority concluded that Saratoga Fishing could not recover in tort for the loss. A dissenting judge believed that the "product itself" was the ship when launched into the stream of commerce by Martinac, its original builder. Consequently, the added equipment was "other property." We granted certiorari to resolve this uncertainty about the proper application of East River. We now agree with the dissenting judge.
II
The facts before us show: (1) a Component Supplier who (2) provided a defective component (the hydraulic system) to a Manufacturer, who incorporated it into a manufactured product (the ship), which (3) the Manufacturer sold to an Initial User, who (4) after adding equipment and using the ship, resold it to a Subsequent User (Saratoga Fishing). The applicable law is general maritime law, "an amalgam of traditional common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules," drawn from both state and federal sources. East River, supra, at 865; see also Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U. S. 16, 20 (1963); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U. S. 625, 630 (1959). The context is purely commercial. The particular question before us requires us to interpret the Court's deci-
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