218
Opinion of the Court
Aguilar that it is no longer good law. We now turn to that inquiry.
III
A
In order to evaluate whether Aguilar has been eroded by our subsequent Establishment Clause cases, it is necessary to understand the rationale upon which Aguilar, as well as its companion case, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985), rested.
In Ball, the Court evaluated two programs implemented by the School District of Grand Rapids, Michigan. The district's Shared Time program, the one most analogous to Title I, provided remedial and "enrichment" classes, at public expense, to students attending nonpublic schools. The classes were taught during regular school hours by publicly employed teachers, using materials purchased with public funds, on the premises of nonpublic schools. The Shared Time courses were in subjects designed to supplement the "core curriculum" of the nonpublic schools. Id., at 375-376. Of the 41 nonpublic schools eligible for the program, 40 were " 'pervasively sectarian' " in character—that is, " 'the purpos[e] of [those] schools [was] to advance their particular religions.' " Id., at 379.
The Court conducted its analysis by applying the three-part test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971):
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion." 473 U. S., at 382-383 (quoting Lemon, supra, at 612-613) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court acknowledged that the Shared Time program served a purely secular purpose, thereby satisfying the first
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