Cite as: 521 U. S. 320 (1997)
Syllabus
wholly inapplicable to a particular case), as Lindh argues the recognition of a negative implication would do here. Pp. 324-326. (b) The statute reveals Congress's general intent to apply the chapter 153 amendments only to cases filed after its enactment. The Act revised chapter 153 for all habeas proceedings. Then § 107 of the Act created an entirely new chapter 154 for habeas proceedings in capital cases, with special rules favorable to those States that meet certain conditions. Section 107(c) expressly applies chapter 154 to pending cases. The negative implication is that the chapter 153 amendments were meant to apply only to cases filed after enactment. If Congress was reasonably concerned to ensure that chapter 154 applied to pending cases, only a different intent explains the fact that it did not enact a similar provision for chapter 153. Had the chapters evolved separately and been joined together at the last minute, after chapter 154 had acquired its mandate, there might have been a possibility that Congress intended the same rule for each chapter, but was careless in the rough-and-tumble. But those are not the circumstances here: § 107(c) was added after the chapters were introduced as a single bill. Section 107(c)'s insertion thus illustrates the familiar rule that negative implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest when the portions of a statute treated differently had already been joined together and were being considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was inserted. See Field v. Mans, 516 U. S. 59. Respondent's one competing explanation—that § 107(c) was intended to fix an ambiguity over when a State would qualify for chapter 154's favorable rules—is too remote to displace the straightforward inference that chapter 153 was not meant to apply to pending cases. Finally, while new § 2264(b)—which was enacted within chapter 154 and provides that new §§ 2254(d) and (e) in chapter 153 would apply to pending chapter 154 cases—does not speak to the present issue with flawless clarity, it tends to confirm the interpretation of § 107(c) adopted here. It shows that Congress assumed that in the absence of § 2264(b), new §§ 2254(d) and (e) would not apply to pending cases. Pp. 326-337. 96 F. 3d 856, reversed and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 337.
James S. Liebman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard C. Neuhoff and Keith A. Findley.
321
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007