Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 3 (1997)

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Cite as: 521 U. S. 457 (1997)

Syllabus

See, e. g., Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, 13-14. This test is clearly satisfied here because (1) the generic advertising of California tree fruit is unquestionably germane to the marketing orders' purposes and, (2) in any event, the assessments are not used to fund ideological activities. Although the wisdom of the generic advertising program may be questioned, its debatable features are insufficient to warrant special First Amendment scrutiny. Pp. 469-474. (c) The Ninth Circuit's decision to apply the Central Hudson test is inconsistent with the very nature and purpose of the collective action program at issue. The AMAA rests on an assumption that in the volatile agricultural commodities markets the public will be best served by compelling cooperation among producers in making economic decisions that would be made independently in a free market. The First Amendment does not provide a basis for reviewing such economic regulation, which enjoys the same strong presumption of validity that this Court accords to other policy judgments made by Congress. Appropriate respect for Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce provides abundant support for the marketing orders' constitutionality. Generic advertising is intended to stimulate consumer demand for an agricultural product in a regulated market. That purpose is legitimate and consistent with the regulatory goals of the overall statutory scheme. The mere fact that one or more producers do not wish to foster generic advertising of their product is not a sufficient reason for judges to override the judgment of the majority of market participants, bureaucrats, and legislators that such programs are beneficial. Pp. 474-477. 58 F. 3d 1367, reversed.

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O’Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined, and in which Thomas, J., joined except as to Part II, post, p. 477. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined as to Part II, post, p. 504.

Alan Jenkins argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Douglas N. Letter, Irene M. Solet, and Daniel Bensing.

Thomas E. Campagne argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., et al. was Clifford C. Kemper. Michael W. McConnell, Alan E.

459

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