Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 44 (1997)

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500

GLICKMAN v. WILEMAN BROTHERS & ELLIOTT, INC.

Souter, J., dissenting

tising tends to soften it. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U. S. 418, 428 (1993); Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of P. R., 478 U. S. 328, 341-342 (1986); Central Hudson, 447 U. S., at 569. This presumption is not, however, automatically convertible into support for the Secretary here. In the cases mentioned, the question has been whether some advertising (in the absence of the government's ban) would be more effective in stimulating demand than no advertising (due to the ban). Here, in contrast, the causal question of direct advancement does not involve comparing the effectiveness of something with nothing, for even without the coercive promotional schemes there would be some voluntary advertising. Thus, the question here requires a comparison of the effectiveness of advertising under the Government's program with the effectiveness of whatever advertising would likely exist without it.13

For this purpose, the Secretary correctly notes that the effectiveness of the Government's regulation must be viewed overall, considering the market behavior of growers and handlers generally, not just in its isolated application to one or a few individuals such as respondents. Edge Broadcasting, supra, at 427. The Secretary therefore argues that though respondents have voiced the desire to do more individual advertising if the system of mandatory assessments were ended, other handlers who benefit from the Government's

13 Although they do not apply the Central Hudson test, the majority does criticize the Court of Appeals' application of it as "illogical" insofar as that court enquired whether collective advertising or purely private advertising is more effective at stabilizing markets, because the Act's basic policy is to achieve its economic goals by compelling cooperation in lieu of independent, competitive decisionmaking. Ante, at 474-475. But the extent to which the Act eliminates competition varies among different marketing orders, and the spottiness of collective advertising schemes under the Act demonstrates that there is no necessary connection between some compelled economic cooperation and forced collective advertising. There is thus nothing "illogical" in comparing the effectiveness of collective and private advertising schemes in the context of the marketing order regime.

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