580
Opinion of the Court
cial resolution of a 'case or controversy' rather than an advisory opinion—is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff." Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 761 (1987).
Appellant, of course, wanted something more than being rid of Plan 330, for he wanted a new plan that would be constitutional. But insofar as he would have been entitled to that following a formal decree of the court, he is now in the same position he would have enjoyed if he had had such a decree: his views on the merits of the proposed plan were heard, and his right to attack it in this appeal is entirely unimpaired. To the extent that he claims anything more, he is trying to do what we have previously said he may not do: to demand an adjudication that the State of Florida, represented by the attorney general, could indeed have demanded, see Growe, 507 U. S., at 34; Wise, 437 U. S., at 540 (opinion of White, J.), but instead waived.
III
The District Court concluded that Plan 386 did not subordinate traditional districting principles to race.7 See 920 F. Supp., at 1254-1255. That finding is subject to review for clear error, see Miller, 515 U. S., at 915-917, of which we find none.
The District Court looked to the shape and composition of District 21 as redrawn in Plan 386 and found them "demonstrably benign and satisfactorily tidy." 920 F. Supp., at 1255. The district is located entirely in the Tampa Bay area, has an end-to-end distance no greater than that of most Flor-7 There is no merit to appellant's contention that the District Court failed to adjudicate the constitutionality of District 21. See Brief for Appellant 35. The District Court noted the deference due the State, and expressly held Plan 386 to be constitutional. 920 F. Supp. 1248, 1255, 1256 (MD Fla. 1996) ("Plan 386 passes any pertinent test of constitutionality and fairness").
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