Cite as: 521 U. S. 702 (1997)
Breyer, J., concurring in judgments
of displacing the legislative ordering of things, without the assurance that its recognition would prove as durable as the recognition of those other rights differently derived. To recognize a right of lesser promise would simply create a constitutional regime too uncertain to bring with it the expectation of finality that is one of this Court's central obligations in making constitutional decisions. See Casey, 505 U. S., at 864-869.
Legislatures, however, are not so constrained. The experimentation that should be out of the question in constitutional adjudication displacing legislative judgments is entirely proper, as well as highly desirable, when the legislative power addresses an emerging issue like assisted suicide. The Court should accordingly stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration. While I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge the legislative institutional competence as the better one to deal with that claim at this time.
Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the judgments.*
I concur in the Court's judgments in these cases substantially for the reasons stated by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion, ante, p. 736.
Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgments.†
I believe that Justice O’Connor's views, which I share, have greater legal significance than the Court's opinion suggests. I join her separate opinion, except insofar as it joins the majority. And I concur in the judgments. I shall briefly explain how I differ from the Court.
I agree with the Court in Vacco v. Quill, post, at 800-809, that the articulated state interests justify the distinction
*[This opinion applies also to No. 95-1858, Vacco et al. v. Quill et al., post, p. 793.]
†[This opinion applies also to No. 95-1858, Vacco et al. v. Quill et al., post, p. 793.]
789
Page: Index Previous 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007