Cite as: 521 U. S. 793 (1997)
Souter, J., concurring in judgment
indifference, prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia—are discussed in greater detail in our opinion in Glucksberg, ante. These valid and important public interests easily satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational relation to some legitimate end.13
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
[For concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor, see ante, p. 736; for opinions concurring in the judgments of Justice Stevens, see ante, p. 738, Justice Ginsburg, see ante, p. 789, and Justice Breyer, see ante, p. 789.]
Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment.
Even though I do not conclude that assisted suicide is a fundamental right entitled to recognition at this time, I accord the claims raised by the patients and physicians in this case and Washington v. Glucksberg a high degree of importance, requiring a commensurate justification. See Washington v. Glucksberg, ante, at 782 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). The reasons that lead me to conclude in Glucksberg that the prohibition on assisted suicide is not arbitrary under the due process standard also support the distinction between assistance to suicide, which is banned, and
13 Justice Stevens observes that our holding today "does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the New York statute may impose an intolerable intrusion on the patient's freedom." Ante, at 751-752 (opinion concurring in judgments). This is true, but, as we observe in Glucksberg, ante, at 735, n. 24, a particular plaintiff hoping to show that New York's assisted-suicide ban was unconstitutional in his particular case would need to present different and considerably stronger arguments than those advanced by respondents here.
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