Cite as: 521 U. S. 811 (1997)
Souter, J., concurring in judgment
our standing doctrine recognized this as a distinction with a dispositive effect, the injury claimed would not qualify: the Court is certainly right in concluding that appellees sue not in personal capacities, but as holders of seats in the Congress. See ante, at 821. And yet the significance of this distinction is not so straightforward. In Braxton County Court v. West Virginia ex rel. State Tax Comm'rs, 208 U. S. 192 (1908), it is true, we dismissed a challenge by a county court to a state tax law for lack of jurisdiction, broadly stating that " 'the interest of a [party seeking relief] in this court should be a personal and not an official interest,' " id., at 198 (quoting Smith v. Indiana, 191 U. S. 138, 149 (1903)); accord, Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 151 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). But the Court found Braxton County "inapplicable" to a challenge by a group of state legislators in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 438, and n. 3 (1939), and found the legislators had standing even though they claimed no injury but a deprivation of official voting power, id., at 437-446.2 Thus, it is at least arguable that the official nature of the harm here does not preclude standing.
Nor is appellees' injury so general that, under our case law, they clearly cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness. On the one hand, appellees are not simply claiming
2 As appellants note, it is also possible that the impairment of certain official powers may support standing for Congress, or one House thereof, to seek the aid of the Federal Judiciary. See Brief for Appellants 26, n. 14 (citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 174 (1927)). And, as appellants concede, see Brief for Appellants 20-21, 25-28, an injury to official authority may support standing for a government itself or its duly authorized agents, see, e. g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62 (1986) (noting that "a State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute" in federal court); ICC v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co., 288 U. S. 14, 25-27 (1933) (explaining that a federal agency had standing to appeal, because an official or an agency could be designated to defend the interests of the Federal Government in federal court); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 441-445 (1939) (discussing cases).
831
Page: Index Previous 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007