Cite as: 521 U. S. 898 (1997)
Stevens, J., dissenting
unelected judges are better off leaving the protection of federalism to the political process in all but the most extraordinary circumstances.20
Perversely, the majority's rule seems more likely to damage than to preserve the safeguards against tyranny provided by the existence of vital state governments. By limiting the ability of the Federal Government to enlist state officials in the implementation of its programs, the Court creates incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself. In the name of State's rights, the majority would have the Federal Government create vast national bureaucracies to implement its policies. This is exactly the sort of thing that the early Federalists promised would not occur, in part as a result of the National Government's ability to rely on the magistracy of the States. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 36, at 234-235 (A. Hamilton); id., No. 45, at 318 (J. Madison).21
With colorful hyperbole, the Court suggests that the unity in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government "would be shattered, and the power of the President would be sub-20 The initial signs are that the Act will play an important role in curbing the behavior about which the majority expresses concern. In the law's first year, the Congressional Budget Office identified only five bills containing unfunded mandates over the statutory threshold. Of these, one was not enacted into law, and three were modified to limit their effect on the States. The fifth, which was enacted, was scarcely a program of the sort described by the majority at all; it was a generally applicable increase in the minimum wage. See Congressional Budget Office, The Experience of the Congressional Budget Office During the First Year of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 13-15 (Jan. 1997).
21 The Court raises the specter that the National Government seeks the authority "to impress into its service . . . the police officers of the 50 States." Ante, at 922. But it is difficult to see how state sovereignty and individual liberty are more seriously threatened by federal reliance on state police officers to fulfill this minimal request than by the aggrandizement of a national police force. The Court's alarmist hypothetical is no more persuasive than the likelihood that Congress would actually enact any such program.
959
Page: Index Previous 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007