124
Opinion of the Court
haps even more importantly on the policy considerations underlying that precedent, we concluded that "a state prosecuting attorney who acted within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution" was not amenable to suit under § 1983. Id., at 410.
Liberally construed, Imbler's complaint included not only a charge that the prosecution had been wrongfully commenced, but also a charge that false testimony had been offered as well as a charge that exculpatory evidence had been suppressed. His constitutional claims were thus broader than any specific common-law antecedent. Nevertheless, relying on common-law decisions providing prosecutors with absolute immunity from tort actions based on claims that the decision to prosecute was malicious and unsupported by probable cause,11 as well as from actions for defamation based on statements made during trial,12 we concluded that
11 See 424 U. S., at 421-422. The cases that the Court cited were decided after 1871 and granted a broader immunity to public prosecutors than had been available in malicious prosecution actions against private persons who brought prosecutions at early common law. See Savile v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (K. B. 1699); Hill v. Miles, 9 N. H. 9 (1837); M. Bigelow, Leading Cases on the Law of Torts 193-204 (1875). However, these early cases were decided before the office of public prosecutor in its modern form was common. See Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 Am. J. Legal Hist. 313, 316 (1973); Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 99, 100-102 (1976); White v. Frank, 855 F. 2d 956, 962 (CA2 1988) (noting that "the availability of the malicious prosecution action has been curtailed with the growth of the office of the public prosecutor"). Thus, the Court in Imbler drew guidance both from the first American cases addressing the availability of malicious prosecution actions against public prosecutors, and perhaps more importantly, from the policy considerations underlying the firmly established common-law rules providing absolute immunity for judges and jurors. See 424 U. S., at 423, n. 20 (discussing similarity in some functions performed by judges, jurors, and prosecutors); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872); Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N. Y. 1810) (Kent, C. J.); Note, Civil Liability of a District Attorney for Quasi-Judicial Acts, 73 U. Pa. L. Rev. 300, 303, n. 13 (1925).
12 See 424 U. S., at 439-440 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
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