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Syllabus
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U. S. 348, 354-355, require that an equivalent exception be read into the statute. To the extent that these cases might be read to establish limits on the scope of federal jurisdiction, they address only whether a cause of action for judicial review of a state administrative decision is within the district courts' original jurisdiction under the diversity statute, § 1332, not whether it is a claim within the district courts' pendent jurisdiction in federal question cases. Even assuming, arguendo, that the decisions are relevant to the latter question, both indicate that federal jurisdiction generally encompasses judicial review of state administrative decisions. See Stude, supra, at 578-579; Horton, supra, at 352. Pp. 168-172.
(d) That § 1367(a) authorizes district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for on-the-record review of administrative decisions does not mean that the jurisdiction must be exercised in all cases. The district courts can decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over such claims in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 357; Gibbs, supra, at 726-727. The supplemental jurisdiction statute enumerates situations in which district courts can refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, § 1367(c), taking into account such factors as the circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state law claims, the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and federal claims. District courts also may be obligated not to decide state law claims (or to stay their adjudication) where one of the abstention doctrines applies. See, e. g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 716. Pp. 172-174.
(e) ICS' contentions that abstention principles required the District Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and that the court should have done so under § 1367(c), are left for the Seventh Circuit to address in the first instance. P. 174.
91 F. 3d 981, reversed and remanded.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, post, p. 175.
Benna Ruth Solomon argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Lawrence Rosenthal and Anne Berleman Kearney.
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