Cite as: 522 U. S. 156 (1997)
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
fronted in Sanders, there is no void to fill. The gap to which Sanders attended—the absence of any forum for "nonstatu-tory" review of federal agency decisions unless § 1331 provided one—simply does not exist in a case brought under a state measure like the Illinois Administrative Review Law. I would therefore resist reading Sanders out of context to mandate cross-system appellate review of local agency decisions.
III
Just last Term, two Members of today's majority recognized the vital interest States have in developing and elaborating state administrative law, for that law regulates the citizen's contact with state and local government at every turn, for example, in gaining life-sustaining public benefits, obtaining a license, or, as in this case, receiving a permit. Last Term's lead opinion observed:
"In the States there is an ongoing process by which state courts and state agencies work to elaborate an administrative law designed to reflect the State's own rules and traditions concerning the respective scope of judicial review and administrative discretion. . . . [T]he elaboration of administrative law . . . is one of the primary responsibilities of the state judiciary. Where, as here, the parties invoke federal principles to challenge state administrative action, the courts of the State have a strong interest in integrating those sources of law within their own system for the proper judicial control of state officials." Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S. 261, 276 (1997) (principal opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J.).
Today's decision jeopardizes the "strong interest" courts of the State have in controlling the actions of local as well as state agencies. State court superintendence can now be displaced or dislodged in any case against a local agency in
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