Cite as: 522 U. S. 252 (1998)
Opinion of Stevens, J.
charged in Count 2, petitioner complained of "a third essential element in there, that being knowledge or knowing." App. 78. In response, the trial judge inserted the word "knowingly" between the words "Defendant" and "possessed" in the instruction defining the necessary mens rea.4 In instructing the jury, the judge first explained that the statute defined the term "firearm" to include a silencer. He then instructed the jury that the defendant could not be found guilty without proof beyond a reasonable doubt that "the Defendant knowingly possessed a 'firearm,' as defined above." Id., at 104. Since the term "firearm" had been "defined above" to include a silencer, that instruction required the jury to determine that the defendant knew that the item he possessed was a silencer.5 A comparable instruction was given on Count 3.6
4 "THE COURT: You want me to insert knowingly between defendant and possessed in the first element, I don't care.
"MR. SALANTRIE: Sure. That would work. "THE COURT: Okay." App. 78-79.
5 Justice Kennedy argues that our "novel reading of the instruction," post, at 261, differs from the interpretation of the trial judge and petition-er's counsel. He is incorrect. First, as we point out, n. 4, supra, the judge responded to the defense counsel's objection to the proposed instruction by inserting "knowingly."
Second, the "colloquy," post, at 260, between the defense counsel and the trial court concerning the instruction in fact supports our interpretation. A "fair reading of the record," ibid., reveals the following:
The defense counsel begins his objection to the instruction by arguing that the Government must prove that the defendant knew that the law required registration of the silencer. App. 84. After some discussion, the defense counsel, by referencing the holding in United States v. Anderson, 885 F. 2d 1248 (CA5 1989) (en banc), shifts his argument to contend that the defendant had to have knowledge of the offending characteristics of the firearm. App. 86. The trial judge responds to this objection as follows:
"THE COURT: If you'll just read the last sentence [of the instruction] you're adequately protected, sir.
"MR. SALANTRIE: It seems the first sentence and the second sentence are mutually exclusive. One says it's not required for him to have
[Footnote 6 is on p. 258]
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