266
Opinion of the Court
with "a written decision and the specific reasons therefor." 5 U. S. C. § 7513(b).
In these carefully delineated rights there is no hint of any right to "put the government to its proof" by falsely denying the charged conduct. Such a right, then, if it exists at all, must come from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." The Court of Appeals stated that "it is un-disputed that the government employees here had a protected property interest in their employment," 89 F. 3d, at 1581, and we assume that to be the case for purposes of our decision.
The core of due process is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U. S. 532, 542 (1985). But we reject, on the basis of both precedent and principle, the view expressed by the Court of Appeals in this action that a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" includes a right to make false statements with respect to the charged conduct.
It is well established that a criminal defendant's right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 173 (1986); United States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 626 (1980); United States v. Grayson, 438 U. S. 41, 54 (1978). Indeed, in United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U. S. 87, 97 (1993), we held that a court could, consistent with the Constitution, enhance a criminal defendant's sentence based on a finding that he perjured himself at trial.
Witnesses appearing before a grand jury under oath are likewise required to testify truthfully, on pain of being prosecuted for perjury. United States v. Wong, 431 U. S. 174 (1977). There we said that "the predicament of being forced to choose between incriminatory truth and falsehood . . . does not justify perjury." Id., at 178. Similarly, one who files a
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